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Fifteen essays are contained in this collection, all relating to Heinz Post’s article
‘Correspondence, Invariance and Heuristics’ (Post, 1971), also reprinted. In this
article, written in the heyday of the post-positivist movement, Post aims to convince
his fellow philosophers of science to bring the issue of heuristics back to the
philosophical stage. Examining a wealth of theories and models from the physics and
chemistry of the last 300 years, Post extracts several strategies of theory construction
of which he considers the General Correspondence Principle to be the most
important. According to this principle, any acceptable new theory should explain
the well-conﬁrmed part of its predecessor. Later Post states the General
Correspondence Principle more precisely and uses it with what he considers its de
facto validity to argue against incommensurability, Kuhn-losses,1 and relativism.
Post himself seems to support (but does not explicitly advocate) a kind of convergent
realism which is most notably expressed in his credo that science progresses linearly.
*Corresponding address.
E-mail address: stephan.hartmann@uni-konstanz.de (S. Hartmann).
1 In his authoritative and comprehensive exposition of Kuhn’s philosophy of science, Hoyningen-Huene
(1993) gives the following explication of Kuhn-losses:
Kuhn often emphasizes the fact that along with revolution F and the associated gain in problem-
solving capacity F generally come certain losses. Among these are losses in the ability to explain
certain phenomena whose authenticity continues to be recognized, losses of scientiﬁc problems of the
narrowing of the ﬁeld of research, and, relatedly, increased specialization and increased difﬁculty in
communicating with outsiders. And so, for Kuhn, the progress which comes with a revolution appears
to have been bought at the price of a certain recession, albeit one quickly forgotten along with the
articles and textbooks in which the conquered theory, in its historical form, is contained. (p. 260; two
footnotes with references to Kuhn have been deleted.)
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The commenting essays, written by former Ph.D. students and a host of
distinguished visitors of Post’s Department at Chelsea College (a former campus of
the University of London whose unfortunate history during the Thatcher
Government is told in the editors’ introduction), take up Post’s ideas, test them
against the historical record, or develop them further. The essays fall roughly into
two groups. The ﬁrst contains detailed case studies and focuses especially on the
status and the role of the General Correspondence Principle. This group includes
papers which carefully investigate the historical or contemporary-science record
(Brown, Chalmers, Cushing, Franklin, Kamminga, Redhead and Scerri) and some
which analyse episodes from science and its history by relying on normative
background assumptions or other scientiﬁc theories (Crawford and Hon). The
second group contains more general philosophical reﬂections (da Costa and French,
Koertge and Saunders) as well as foundational investigations of topics like quantum
mechanics and the special theory of relativity (Kilmister and Tonkinson and Fine).
I cannot do justice to all of these articles, but will concentrate on those which are
related to the issue which Post himself considered to be the most important of his
insightful article: the General Correspondence Principle (GCP). This will be
introduced in the next section.
The papers are well written and original. Furthermore, they are closely related to
the practice of science, living up to the programmatic opening statement of Post’s
essay: ‘Philosophers of science should be concerned with Science; that is, with the
activity of scientists, whether the concern be descriptive, prescriptive, or both’ (p. 3).2
It is worth mentioning that the book does not exclusively examine episodes from
physics and its history, but also contains quite detailed case studies from special
sciences such as biology (paper by Kamminga) and chemistry (paper by Scerri). The
editors and authors of this Festschrift made a considerable effort to make it a
coherent whole. All contributions refer to Post’s original article, although this
sometimes seems a little forced. The case studies will especially help readers interested
in the topic of theory change and the relation between successive theories to back up
their views by appealing to the scientiﬁc record. These case studies are the strong part
of the book; they can be used as a point of departure for the discussion of a variety of
issues in the philosophy of science. However, a discussion is missing of the question of
which new or modiﬁed view of the relation between theories could emerge from the
collaborative work of all authors. In Section 2, I shall develop and evaluate such a
view on the basis of the articles of the current volume. I will then go on and
investigate in Section 3 how one can make sense philosophically of this new picture.
1. Post’s general correspondence principle
The model for Post’s GCP is the quantum-mechanical correspondence principle.
This principle played a crucial role for Bohr and others in the process of constructing
2Page citations always refer to the present volume. When quoting Post’s reprinted contribution, the
page number of the original publication can be obtained by adding 212:
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the new quantum mechanics in the 1920s. It was expected that quantum mechanics
would account, within certain limits, for the well-conﬁrmed phenomena of classical
physics. The quantum-mechanical correspondence principle is, however, somewhat
more complicated, as Radder (1991) has shown. The latter consists of various
interrelated parts which I will, however, not discuss here. In a ﬁrst attempt, Post
gives the following characterization of ‘his’ GCP:
Roughly speaking, this is the requirement that any acceptable new theory L
should account for its predecessor S by ‘degenerating’ into that theory under
those conditions under which S has been well-conﬁrmed by tests. (p. 16)
The GCP is claimed to be valid even across scientiﬁc revolutions. It presupposes
that S and L ‘refer (in their statements) to at least some events or facts which are
identiﬁably the same’ (p. 8) or, to use a contemporary phrasing, that S and L share a
common set of phenomena. The domain of L is assumed to be larger than the
domain of S and the account given by L will usually be more precise (or at least not
less precise) than the account of the phenomena given by S: A typical example is the
relation between classical mechanics and the special theory of relativity; the latter
theory also correctly describes particles that have very high velocities and provides a
more accurate account at low velocities than the former.
Post goes on to discuss several possible relations between S and L that range from
a complete reduction (which seems hardly ever to occur in science) to approximate or
inconsistent correspondence, but without explanatory losses (such as the relation just
mentioned between classical mechanics and the special theory of relativity). Other
possible relations between S and L that exhibit losses would count as evidence
against the GCP; Post holds that these relations have never occurred in the history of
science in the last 300 years F apart from one exception which will be discussed
below.
One of Post’s favourite examples to support the GCP is the periodic system which
survived the quantum-mechanical revolution. Post explains:
The periodic system is the basis of inorganic chemistry. This pattern was not
changed when the whole of chemistry was reduced to physics, nor do scientists
ever expect to see an explanation in the realm of chemistry which destroys this
pattern. The chemical atom is no longer strictly an atom, yet whatever revolutions
may occur in fundamental physics, the ordering of chemical atoms will remain.
(p. 25)
Post generalizes this example and maintains that the low-level structure of theories
is particularly stable, while higher and less-conﬁrmed levels are subject to change in
the process of scientiﬁc theorizing. The pattern of the atoms remains, although
quantum mechanics replaced the former framework theory. Da Costa and French
call this the ‘Principle of the Absolute Nature of Pragmatic Truth’: ‘[O]nce a theory
has been shown to be pragmatically true in a certain domain, it remains
pragmatically true, within that domain, for all time’ (p. 146). This principle seems,
at ﬁrst sight, to be quite plausible; but is it correct? Doubts arise once one recalls that
Post himself confesses that the successful part of S may be smaller from the
S. Hartmann / Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 33 (2002) 79–94 81
perspective of the new theory L than from the perspective of S (p. 20). Given this, it
is not clear how there can be a ‘resistant kernel’ in the long run that ‘remains
pragmatically true y for all time’.
Later Post reﬁnes his proposal to also account for theories S and L with a different
vocabulary. These vocabularies have to be translated into each other and this
translation T may turn out to be more difﬁcult than a mere one-to-one mapping.
Also, a condition Q on L has to be speciﬁed such that the truncated L and S have
(perhaps only approximately) the same domain. If the well-conﬁrmed part of S is
denoted by Sn (the extent of which is only a conjecture at a given time3), the GCP
can be conveniently expressed as Sn ¼TðLjQÞF i.e., the well-conﬁrmed part of S is
identical to the suitably translated part of L which fulﬁls the condition Q: If Ln is the
well-conﬁrmed part of L and Snn is the intersection of Sn and Ln; then the thesis of
zero Kuhn-losses is that Sn is identical to Snn: Post claims that the historical record
supports this thesis.4
It should be noted, however, that Post’s analysis does not take into account what
Hoyningen-Huene (1993) aptly called the ‘loser’s perspective’. From this perspective,
there are indeed successes of the old theory which the new theory cannot account
for.5 Besides, even from the ‘winner’s perspective’ the thesis of zero Kuhn-losses may
be too strong, as Saunders concedes in his contribution. Saunders writes that
‘Laudan (1981) is right to insist that one can always ﬁnd some theorem, deduction,
conjecture, or explanation that has no precise correlation in the successor theory
(what Post calls ‘Kuhn-losses’)’ (p. 296). He then goes on, though, to distinguish
between signiﬁcant and insigniﬁcant Kuhn-losses; only the insigniﬁcant ones are, of
course, ‘allowed’. I will come back to this issue below. Radder (1991) has pointed out
another problem for Post’s approach. Not all equations of L might ‘degenerate’ into
equations of S: As an example, consider the famous formula E ¼ m0c2 for the energy
of a particle with rest mass m0: This equation makes sense only in the special theory
of relativity. In the well-known limit of low velocities (b :¼ v=c-0) it remains
unaltered; it does not, however, correspond to an equation of classical mechanics.
According to Post, the GCP is both a descriptive and a normative thesis. It is
considered to be a post hoc elimination criterion, and theories that do not fulﬁl it
should be, as Post boldly advises, consigned to the ‘wastepaper basket’ (p. 23).
Examining cases from the history of science, Post only spotted one obvious
‘counterexample’ to the GCP. Ironically, it is the best theory we have today:
Quantum Mechanics. This theory cannot be strictly reduced to classical mechanics
(p. 21), and this is a crucial failure which Post blames on the supposed
incompleteness of quantum mechanics (pp. 22, 34). Quantum mechanics therefore
does not, for Post, count as a case against the GCP; instead, the fact that quantum
mechanics does not fulﬁl the GCP shows that this theory should not be accepted or
at least that it should not be considered to be the successor of classical mechanics. It
3Cf. Koertge (1973), 172f.
4For a comparison of Post’s GCP with other correspondence principles, such as the ones suggested by
Fadner, Krajewski, Radder, and Zahar, see Radder (1991).
5Cf. Hoyningen-Huene (1993), pp. 260–262, and the references to the work of Kuhn cited therein.
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belongs, perhaps, in the wastepaper basket. Other proponents of a GCP, such as
Radder, do not go as far and emphasize the correspondence relations which hold
between quantum mechanics and classical mechanics F and so do Cushing, Fine,
and Saunders in their contributions, though in different ways. Their arguments will
be examined in the next section.
Before doing so, another issue needs to be mentioned. So far, the following three
theses are in conﬂict: (1) Post’s GCP is descriptively correct, (2) belief in the truth of
quantum mechanics is justiﬁed,6 and (3) quantum mechanics and classical mechanics
share a common set of phenomena. Rather than rejecting thesis (1) or (2) one might
doubtF following Cartwright’s leadF thesis (3). Cartwright (1999) argues that we
have good reasons to believe that there are two disjoint classes of phenomena; some
can be modelled by using the toolbox of quantum mechanics, others by relying on
classical mechanics. There is consequently no quantum-mechanical model of
classical phenomena. Contrary to Cartwright, however, Post and (I believe), most
physicists hold the view that quantum mechanics and classical mechanics do share a
common set of phenomena. They assume that quantum mechanics accounts for the
phenomena of classical mechanics in principle; it is merely a matter of computational
complexity to demonstrate this. This might, as Cartwright supposes, be a
metaphysical dream.
Consider the following case: theory S accounts for a set of phenomena. Now, new
phenomena occur, which are similar (in a certain sense) to the phenomena accounted
for by S; but these new phenomena do not belong to the domain of S: What can be
done? One option, which is in accordance with the spirit of the GCP, is to develop a
theory L that accounts for both, i.e., the phenomena already described by S and the
new and so far unexplained phenomena. The other option is to start from scratch
and develop a theory for the new phenomena only. Here is an example from current
physics. For almost 15 years, theoretical condensed matter physicists have aimed at
understanding high-temperature superconductivity. This is an extraordinarily
difﬁcult task and no consensus has been reached so far even about the ‘global’
strategy of research. Some theorists suggest following the lead of the theory of
conventional superconductors (the so-called BCS theory) as closely as possible. This
would eventually enable a uniﬁed treatment of conventional and non-conventional
superconductors. Others propose more revolutionary models that do not relate to
the established BCS theory in a straightforward manner. To be more precise, these
new theories do not ‘degenerate’ into the BCS theory in some limit.7 The point I wish
to make is that it is not always obvious to which theories the GCP can be applied.
Should the revolutionary theories of high-temperature superconductivity be
6I here follow the useful distinction between acceptance and belief proposed by da Costa and French in
their contribution:
Acceptance differs from factual belief in that the former involves a voluntary act of commitment,
whereas the latter does not. It is, however, tied to a representational belief in the partial truth of what is
accepted and the commitment is to the use of the representation or model concerned. Both inconsistent
and strictly false theories may be regarded as partially true and accepted in this sense. (p. 155)
7For details see Hartmann (1999b; 2001, in preparation).
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abandoned? The task to decide on this issue is a matter of scientiﬁc research, and it is
often not clear at the outset what the best strategy is.
It is instructive to discuss Franklin’s contribution in this context. Franklin
presents a good account of the history of alternative gravitational theories that
explain the experimentally established violation of CP symmetry in certain quantum
systems. The new suggested force, called the Fifth Force, turns out to be a
modiﬁcation of the Newtonian law of gravitation which is, in a speciﬁc limit,
obtained by a ‘degeneration’ process from the Fifth Force. But why should disparate
phenomena such as the attraction of the Sun and the Earth, and symmetry violations
at the quantum level, be treated by one and the same theory? Why is this a case that
supports the validity of the GCP? This appears, at ﬁrst sight, highly mysterious, but
the story Franklin tells makes the detailed arguments of scientists in favour of such a
conjecture.
What is the outcome of the discussion so far? First of all, it is not clear when the
GCP is applicable. This is demonstrated by my example of quantum mechanics and
the case of high-temperature superconductivity. Secondly, when the GCP is applied,
it often does not hold strictly, as Radder’s example shows. Besides, there are losses
from the loser’s perspective and maybe also from the winner’s. Thirdly, as a
consequence of all this, there is a tension between the practice of actual science and a
normative reading of the GCP. But still: Post rightly remarked that there is a lot of
continuity in scientiﬁc theorizing, even across scientiﬁc revolutions. The relations
between various theories in the history of science are, however, much more
complicated than the GCP would lead us to believe. Perhaps there is no single and
non-trivial principle that captures the rich structure and variety of developing
scientiﬁc theories. This can only be established empirically. What is needed is a
careful examination of a lot of episodes from contemporary science and the history
of science on which a meta-induction can be based. As a ﬁrst step, it is helpful to
highlight various relations that hold between successive scientiﬁc theories. The
contributions to the present volume motivate a list which will be presented in the
next section.
2. A plurality of correspondence relations
The contributors to the present volume were invited to test Post’s GCP against the
historical and scientiﬁc record. At the end of the day, a considerable number of them
boldly conclude that ‘Post ½y was right, and Kuhn was wrong’ (Saunders, p. 321).
Things are, however, not as simple as I made it out in the previous section. In the
development of scientiﬁc theories, continuities as well as discontinuities appear.
Hence, the interesting question to be addressed is: which elements of S and L
correspond to each other, and which elements do not? Are there general rules that
guide practising scientists in those difﬁcult decision situations? As a prolegomenon to
such a task, it is reasonable to examine more closely how speciﬁc scientiﬁc theories
are related to each other. Which elements are taken over, what are the motives for
doing so, and how are the elements of the old theory made to ﬁt the new theory?
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Based on the case studies of the current volume, I will address these questions and
provide a preliminary and presumably incomplete list of correspondence relations
which may hold between successive theories. Some theories exhibit more than one of
these relations, and some correspondences appear at different stages of the
development of a theory.
A useful ﬁrst distinction is between ontological and epistemological correspondence
relations. An ontological correspondence relation holds between S and L if some or
all of the entities of S are also entities of L: As Saunders convincingly argues in his
contribution, a host of intriguing problems (such as reference, etc.) emerge here;
I will therefore follow Saunders’ implicit advice and consider only epistemological
correspondence relations,8 of which the following types can be distinguished.
1. Term Correspondence. Here, certain terms from S are taken over into L: This is a
standard strategy in the development of scientiﬁc theories. In The Structure of
Scientific Revolutions, Thomas S. Kuhn writes that ‘[s]ince new paradigms are
born from old ones, they ordinarily incorporate much of the vocabulary and
apparatus, both conceptual and manipulative, that the traditional paradigm had
previously employed’ (Kuhn, 1996, p. 149). Now it is well-known that Kuhn also
argues in the very same book that this continuity goes along with meaning
variance and problems of reference. A standard example is the meaning shift from
‘mass’ in classical mechanics to ‘mass’ in the special theory of relativity. A
disclaimer or two is in order here. Term Correspondence does not imply that all
terms of a theory correspond to terms in the successor theory. Often, only a few
key terms are carried over, while others are left aside and new terms are coined in
addition. Also, a correspondence relation between two theories can be established
by a suitable translation of the respective terms, as Post has also pointed out.
Term Correspondence is a rather minimal requirement; it is presupposed by all
other corrrespondence relations to be discussed below.
2. Numerical Correspondence. Here S and L agree on the numerical values of some
quantities (cf. Radder, 1991, pp. 203–204). Numerical Correspondence therefore
presupposes Term Correspondence. An example discussed by da Costa and
French and also by Scerri in their contributions is the spectrum of hydrogen in the
Bohr model and in quantum mechanics. Although the assumptions that were
made to calculate the spectrum differ considerably in both theories, they
nevertheless lead to the same numerical values. Again, this is a rather weak kind
of correspondence relation which is moreover usually realized only approximately
(as in the example just discussed). Its heuristic value is low since the principle can
only be applied post hoc. Obviously, Numerical Correspondence is only
interesting in the mathematical sciences; in large parts of biology and archaeology,
for example, the requirement of Numerical Correspondence does not apply.
3. Observational Correspondence. This kind of correspondence relation is introduced
in Fine’s contribution in the context of his interesting resolution of the quantum
8Saunders suggests omitting reference to Fregean sense (pp. 303, 307) and urges that we study only the
relation between the mathematical structure of the theories in question.
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mechanical measurement problem. Fine, like Einstein whom he quotes
approvingly, does not accept Cushing’s claim that Bohm’s version of quantum
mechanics should have been chosen according to Post’s GCP (p. 262), because the
Bohm theory ‘did not enable one to retrieve the classical and well-conﬁrmed
account of a ball rebounding elastically between two walls’ (p. 280). It therefore
does not fulﬁl Post’s (and Einstein’s) correspondence principle. Bohm’s theory
does, however, fulﬁl a weaker form of a correspondence principle. Fine writes:
‘[W]here the classical account itself is well-conﬁrmed, the Bohm theory
‘degenerates’ into the classical account of what we are expected to observe under
well-deﬁned conditions of observation’ (p. 280). Unfortunately, the standard
Copenhagen version of quantum mechanics does not fulﬁl the principle of
Observational Correspondence, and Fine therefore presents his solution of the
measurement problem in order to restore this. Abstracting from quantum
mechanics, Observational Correspondence means that L ‘degenerates’ into what
we are expected to observe according to Sn under well-deﬁned conditions of
observation. Observational Correspondence, like Numerical Correspondence,
presupposes Term Correspondence, but differs from Numerical Correspondence
which may also apply when the quantities in question cannot be observed.
Besides, Observational Correspondence relations can also hold in sciences which
do not represent their content numerically. Observational Correspondence
emphasizes the role of the conditions of observation which are especially
important in the context of quantum mechanics. A heuristic principle based on
the demand of Observational Correspondence is again only a post hoc selection
criterion. It is of no help in the actual process of constructing new theories.
Observational Correspondence alone also does not sufﬁce to provide an
explanation for the success of the old theory. It is therefore weaker than
Post’s GCP.
4. Initial or Boundary Condition Correspondence. According to the syntactic view of
scientiﬁc theories, which most authors of the present volume adopt (a notable
exception is da Costa and French), a theory is a set of axioms (or laws) plus
suitable initial or boundary conditions. Kamminga complains in her contribution
that the philosophical focus (including Post’s) is too much on the axioms (or
laws), leaving initial and boundary conditions aside. This is unfortunate, since
especially in the non-formal sciences, Kamminga claims, these conditions play an
important role which is relevant to the issue of inter-theoretic relations. It turns
out that there are theories which incorporate consequences of their predecessor as
an initial or boundary condition. Kamminga, whose examinations of various
consecutive theories of the origin of life are illuminating, sums up her
methodological points as follows: ‘[I]n the attempt to integrate the original
theory T with another theory outside its domain, some consequence of the latter
is incorporated into T as an antecedent condition, which then places strong
constraints on the selection of laws that have explanatory relevance in the
modiﬁed theory T 0’ (p. 77). This procedure, therefore, provides a link between the
two theories. This way of connecting two theories is, however, a very loose one. It
has some heuristic value, as Kamminga herself claims, but it should be noted that
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the assumptions taken over from the predecessor theory remain unexplained in
the successor theory.
5. Law Correspondence. Laws from S also appear in L: This kind of correspondence
relation often holds only approximately. An example is the kinetic energy in
classical mechanics and in the special theory of relativity. For low velocities,
TCM ¼ 1=2 mv2 and TSRT ¼ ðm  m0Þ c2 ¼ 1=2 mv2 	 ð1þ 3=4b
2 þ Oðb4ÞÞ are
approximately the same. Therefore, the special theory of relativity reproduces
and explains the successful part of classical mechanics. It is probably this kind of
correspondence relation that Post had in mind when he suggested his GCP. Law
Correspondence implies Numerical Correspondence and presupposes Term
Correspondence, the difﬁculties of which (such as meaning variance, etc.)
therefore occur again. Despite all this, it is required that the terms in question
have the same operational meaning in S and L (cf. Fadner, 1985, p. 832). In many
cases, Law Correspondence is only a post hoc selection criterion of theory choice.
As Radder’s above-mentioned example demonstrates, it may only hold for some
of the laws of the theories in question.
6. Model Correspondence. This type of a correspondence relation comes in two
variants. (1) A model which belongs to S survives theory change and reoccurs
in L: A typical example is the harmonic oscillator which is widely used in classical
mechanics, but is also applied in quantum mechanics and in quantum ﬁeld theory.
It should be noted that models, such as the harmonic oscillator, are not only taken
over by the theory which succeeds the original theory, but also by quite unrelated
theories. This is best seen by pointing to all other theories of physics which
employ the harmonic oscillator; in fact, it is difﬁcult to ﬁnd a theory which does
not employ this model! Model Correspondence of this ﬁrst kind has a
considerable heuristic potential; it is, however, not guaranteed that the new
theory explains the success of the old theory, because the model in question may
be embedded in a completely new framework theory which also affects the overall
correspondence relation between S and L: (2) Post mentions another strategy of
theory construction which takes models seriously: ‘In this case we adopt a model
already available which may initially have been offered as an arbitrary
articulation of the formalism only. ½y It is a case of borrowing a model of the
S-theory which contained features not essential for the modelling of the S-theory
(‘neutral analogy’), and assigning physical signiﬁcance to such extra features’
(p. 29). An example is crystallographic models which were used already a century
before physicists identiﬁed the units of the regular lattices with physical atoms.
Sometimes, Post concludes, scientists built ‘better than they knew’ (p. 30). This
example also shows that Model Correspondence of this second kind may indeed
lead to an explanation of the success of the predecessor theory.9 However, the
criterion is highly fallible, as Post himself grants.
7. Structure Correspondence. Here, the structures of S and L correspond. But what is
a structure, and what does it mean that two structures correspond? In his
contribution, Saunders suggests using the term ‘structure’ only in its precise
9More on the relation between models and theories can be found in Hartmann (1999a).
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mathematical meaning (groups, etc.). This unfortunately restricts the application
of the correspondence principle to a speciﬁc part of physics which Saunders calls
‘dynamics’. Saunders’ own deﬁnition of ‘dynamics’ is somewhat unorthodox
and not very precise: ‘By ‘dynamics’ I mean to include statics and kinematics,
as well as mechanics and ﬁeld theory’ (p. 295). Given this mathematical
understanding of ‘structure’, it is obvious how to ﬂesh out the idea of a
correspondence relation between two structures; here mathematical concepts
such as sub-groups and group contractions are applied. Indeed, many ‘dynamical’
theories can be linked to each other in this way, as Saunders shows in detail.
A typical example is the relation between the inhomogeneous Lorentz group
and the inhomogeneous Galilei group which ‘correspond’ in a precise
mathematical sense. In examples like this, Structure Correspondence works best.
Another interesting case, also discussed by Saunders, is the relation between the
theories of Ptolemy and Copernicus. Saunders shows that ‘[a]n astronomy based
only on epicycles ½y corresponds to an expansion of the form
P
i ci expðioitÞ
(with the earth chosen as origin)’ (p. 299). The mathematical structure of both
theories is (perhaps only approximately) the same. There is therefore no reason to
worry F with Feyerabend, Kuhn, Laudan and the likes F about the
abandonment of the Aristotelian world-view or a wholesale change of paradigm
(p. 298).
Saunders’ large-scale ﬁght against relativism (for Saunders, ‘relativism’ is a
collective name for social constructivism, historicist epistemology, linguistic
holism, and anti-realism; cf. p. 295f) appears somewhat cheap; parts of theories
where problems for the idea of correspondence show up are deemed ‘insigniﬁcant’
(such as the ontology of a theory,10 but also laws, etc.), while only the
mathematical structure of a theory remains, in some sense, stable. But even here
things are not that easy. With respect to the role of gravity, Saunders concedes
that he does ‘not suggest that these things can be completely codiﬁed’, but goes on
to confess that this strategy ‘is, and ½y has always been, the essence of the
enterprise of dynamics’ (p. 306). Confessions like this are not enough to make one
accept the editors’ judgement that Saunders provides a ‘vigorous defence of the
cumulative, progressive view of the history of physics’ (p. xxiii). Saunders showed,
however, that mathematical structures of consecutive theories may and often do
correspond in a strict mathematical sense.
It should be noted that it is also possible to talk of structures outside the realm
of (what Saunders calls) dynamics. In their contribution, da Costa and French
provide a ﬂexible framework that allows the comparison of scientiﬁc theories with
different structures. Their central idea is to add partial structures to the model-
theoretical account of scientiﬁc theories which also include inconsistent theories
the role of which in the dynamics of theories da Costa and French rightly
emphasize (p. 142).
Structural Correspondence does not imply Numerical Correspondence. Often,
the structure is ‘too far away’ from the empirical basis of a theory to guarantee
10Cf. Saunders’ discussion of the ether, p. 299.
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continuity at that level (especially in the cases Saunders has in mind). It is
therefore not at all trivial to reproduce the empirical success of the precursor
theory once one has decided to take over parts of the structure of the old theory.
Despite this, Structure Correspondence has a very high heuristic value, especially
in the kind of physics that Redhead discusses in his contribution, viz. the quest for
an ultimate theory. Because of the huge gap between these theories and the world
to which we have empirical access, abstract reasoning, such as symmetry
considerations, is often the only tool which enables scientists to proceed.
Three conclusions can be drawn from the above analysis. First, successive theories
can be related in many ways. Sometimes only Numerical Correspondence
holds (approximately), at other times entire mathematical structures correspond.
Hence I suggest that philosophical issues, such as meaning variance and
incommensurability, should ﬁrst be discussed ‘locally’, i.e. on the basis of concrete
case studies that exemplify speciﬁc types of relations between scientiﬁc theories (p.
262). Second, there are continuities and discontinuities in scientiﬁc theorizing,
although it is not clear a priori which elements of a theory will survive theory change,
and which ones will have to go. An additional difﬁculty for correspondence theorists
is the notorious problem of underdetermination which Cushing discusses in his
contribution (p. 262). Maybe there is no unique best choice of which elements of
successive theories should correspond and which elements should not correspond
with each other. Third, the philosophical project of a methodology is best described
by the picture of a toolbox. According to this view, methodologists extractF on the
basis of a wealth of case studies F a set of methods and techniques which can
tentatively be applied by practicing scientists in a particular situation. What is in the
toolbox may, however, depend on time: methods, as well as scientiﬁc theories and
goals may change over time (cf. Cushing, 1998, p. 368). Good scientists know, of
course, already a lot of tricks and methods, and they also know how to use them
ﬂexibly and appropriately. This view of the status of methodology is a middle
ground between two extreme positions. Zahar (1989, pp. 258ff) defends a rather
strong form of a rational heuristics which leaves little room to chance and other
inﬂuences, while Popper’s (1972, Chapter 7) evolutionary picture supports the
opposite view: there is no rational heuristics, it is the job of the scientists to
make bold conjectures which then have to ‘survive’ empirical tests and rational
criticism (cf. Radder, 1991, pp. 201f). My conclusion seems, after all, to be similar to
Post’s own view on the role of heuristics which he illustrates with an apt analogy:
‘The study of the structure of existing houses may help us in constructing new
houses’ (p. 5).
3. Rationality, realism and coherence
How can one interpret philosophically the prevailing continuity in scientiﬁc
theorizing? Even if there is no single principle, such as Post’s GCP, which governs
the dynamics of theory construction, the existence of various correspondence
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relations between successive scientiﬁc theories cannot be doubted. In ‘The Social
Construction of What?’, Hacking (1999) claims that from now on,
Future large-scale instability seems quite unlikely. We will witness radical
developments at present unforseen. But what we have may persist, modiﬁed and
built upon. The old idea that sciences are cumulative may reign once more.
Between 1962 (when Kuhn published Structure) and the late 1980s, the problem
for philosophers of science was to understand revolution.11 Now the problem is to
understand stability. (p. 85)
Stability, as Hacking uses the term, is closely related to da Costa and French’s
‘Principle of the Absolute Nature of Pragmatic Truth’. The Second Law and
Maxwell’s Equations, for example, ‘are not going to go away’ (Hacking, 1999). And
neither will many of the theories and laws discussed in the volume under discussion
go away. Hacking’s stability thesis (which he owes to Weinberg) is, however,
considerably weaker than Post’s GCP. Stability in Hacking’s sense does not imply
progress in theory construction. Cartwright’s dappled world, for example, is stable in
Hacking’s sense, but does not ﬁt Post’s account. As a result of my previous sections,
it is clear that Post’s GCP is too strong and does not hold empirically in a strict
sense. A weaker, though testable and philosophically justiﬁable version of a
universal correspondence principle, based on the typology and the toolbox view
outlined above, is difﬁcult to formulate. That is why, in the remainder of this review,
I only address the question of how the existence of various correspondence relations
between successive scientiﬁc theories can be interpreted. My discussion is partly
inspired by the arguments for the stability thesis Hacking discusses. These arguments
shall be addressed ﬁrst.
To begin with, it should be noted that Hacking’s main aim is somewhat different
from mine here. He is concerned with a clariﬁcation of the positions put forward in
the so-called science wars. In this controversy, two opposing views can be identiﬁed.
Roughly speaking, there are realists (such as Weinberg) and constructionists (such as
Pickering). The realists subscribe to the thesis that the progress of science can be
explained by pointing to factors internal to science only, while constructionists
emphasize the impact of factors external to science (i.e., social and cultural factors).
I will now investigate whether the existence of correspondence relations between
successive scientiﬁc theories can be justiﬁed or explained by means of each of these
contrary positions. It turns out that both accounts meet serious difﬁculties. I will
then suggest a middle ground between the accounts that makes use of the
epistemological concept of coherence.
The first option, realism, comes in different variants. One of them is convergent
realism which holds that successive theories of ‘mature science’ approximate the
11This assessment is also Post’s opinion: ‘From the point of view of present-day [i.e. 1971, S.H.]
philosophy, the fact that there is continuous progress in science is a problem, while the fact that there are
occasional revolutions is not’ (p. 25).
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truth (i.e., the ultimate or ﬁnal theory) better and better.12 This presupposes the
existence of a measure of the distance of a given theory from the truth (or at least an
ordering relation), which is a controversial topic despite all the worthwhile work on
verisimilitude and truthlikeness, and conﬂicts with the many discontinuities that
have emerged in the development of ‘mature’ scientiﬁc theories, as Laudan (1981)
has convincingly demonstrated. But perhaps there is no ultimate theory, as Redhead
speculates in his contribution. It is possible that the process of constructing ever
better theories never ends, because ‘there are inﬁnitely many levels of structure that
can be unpacked, like an inﬁnitely descending sequence of Chinese boxes, or to use
the more colloquial expression: it is boojums all the way down’ (p. 331). Obviously,
Laudan’s critique is relevant here as well. A weaker variant of convergent realismF
which seems to be able to handle the problems raised by Laudan and others F is
structural realism. According to this position, defended implicitly by Saunders in his
contribution, at least the high-level mathematical structures of scientiﬁc theories
converge. Continuity on the level of ontology and perhaps even on the level of one or
another law is, however, not required. This might appear to be the result of an
immunization strategy, to use Hans Albert’s apt term, because Saunders calls only
those elements of theories signiﬁcant of which we have good reasons to assume that
they do in fact correspond. Be this as it may, my discussion in the previous section
showed that there does not seem to be enough empirical evidence for structural
realism. Besides, there are more plausible ways to explain the persistence of certain
mathematical structures; I will come back to this below.13
The second option, constructionism, also comes in different variants. All of them
emphasize the role of factors external to science. In his section on stability, Hacking
quotes the historian of science Norton Wise who argues that culture and science are
inseparably connected with each other. Cultural inﬂuences go into the discovery of
scientiﬁc theories and leave an indelible footprint there. Weinberg, whom Hacking
quotes approvingly, maintains, however, that these inﬂuences ‘have been reﬁned
away’ (Hacking, 1999, p. 86). Koertge, in her contribution, makes a similar point (in
a decision-theoretical context) with respect to the inﬂuence of ideologies on scientiﬁc
theories. What about the remarkable stability of scientiﬁc theories? Is there a viable
constructionist explanation for this? Following roughly Kuhnian lines of thought,
one could state that scientists grow up and are trained within a certain research
tradition, they learn all the theories and techniques of this tradition and, of course,
they want to promote their career; these scientists are well advised to demonstrate
their afﬁliation to the tradition in question by following the research program of that
tradition; all junior scientists who are too radical are not made proteg!es and their
careers may take a turn for the worse. The scientiﬁc community does not reward
disloyal behaviour. Another, and perhaps somewhat more plausible, variant to
explain the continuity in scientiﬁc theorizing by external factors is this: it is simply
12Post also seems to support this view: ‘Contrary to Kuhn, I believe that scientiﬁc theory converges
towards a unique truth’ (p. 28).
13Another realist way put forward to account for the stability of scientiﬁc theories is Radder’s (1988,
1991) moderate realism.
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too costly to start from scratch when confronted with a new problem. Scientists who
follow this strategy will not be able to produce a sufﬁcient number of papers in
renowned journals that are necessary to survive in academia. This also explains why
the mathematical structure of theories is extremely stable: since so much depends on
it, a revision would be very costly indeed. Although there might be some truth in
these stories, I think that there is more to be said.
The third and ﬁnal option relies on the concept of coherence and takes, in a way,
the best of both worlds. It is weaker than realism (although coherence is compatible
with realism) and leaves enough space for external factors. Here, the success of
correspondence considerations in scientiﬁc theorizing is explained by showing that
this way of conducting research leads to more coherent belief sets. How can this be
achieved? First of all, the notion of ‘coherence’ must be clariﬁed. BonJour (1985)
explains:
What then is coherence? Intuitively, coherence is a matter of how well a body of
belief ‘hangs together’: how well its component beliefs ﬁt together, agree or
dovetail with each other, so as to produce an organized, tightly structured system
of beliefs, rather than either a helter-skelter collection or a set of conﬂicting
subsystems. It is reasonably clear that this ‘hanging together’ depends on the
various sorts of inferential, evidential, and explanatory relations which obtain
among the various members of a system of belief, and especially on the more
holistic and systematic of these. (p. 93)
This explication still needs to be made more precise in order for us to be able to
compare the coherence of two different belief setsF say, before and after a scientiﬁc
revolution. To assess the coherence of a belief set, a colleague and I have constructed
a probabilistic model that yields a coherence measure (cf. Bovens & Hartmann,
2000). This measure is a function of the joint probability of the propositions in the
belief set, as well as of the conditional dependencies among these propositions.
Stating the joint probability is a rough and ready way to take into account factors
external to science. Factors that are (mostly) internal to science, such as the ‘the
various sorts of inferential, evidential, and explanatory relations which obtain
among the various members of a system of belief ’, discussed by BonJour, are
modelled by means of conditional probability distributions. Our model accounts for
both factors. Additional assumptions are needed in the model to show that the
coherence is higher if the new theory is linked to the old theory through
correspondence relations than if this condition is not fulﬁlled. Although we have
not yet modelled this claim within our framework, this does seem to be a plausible
hypothesis. Further support comes from Koertge who states that ‘the fact that a new
theory stands in a correspondence relation to a refuted but largely successful older
theory may in some circumstances confer a degree of prior plausibility on that
new theory’ (p. 134). This prior plausibility enters our coherence measure. All this
can, of course, only be shown in detailed models. It should be clear, however, that
the account just sketched allows for a rational reconstruction of radical breaks in the
history of science: radical breaks turn out to be necessary in order to render possible
more coherent belief sets (cf. Salmon, 1990). This is an advantage of the coherence
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account over the convergent realism account, but there is also a disadvantage which
Kosso emphasizes in his textbook: ‘Coherence among theories will secure a cozy
network of cooperation and consistent beliefs, but there is no obvious reason to
think it will secure any anchor to reality’ (Kosso, 1992, p. 136). Maybe we cannot
achieve more than an account of nature that is as coherent as possible.14
Science and the dynamics of its theories is much more complicated than Post’s
GCP suggests. His principle was only a ﬁrst approximation, and so were his reasons
for adopting and defending the principle. A real understanding of how theories are
related can only be obtained by carefully analysing many detailed case studies. The
contributions in this volume provide a good starting point for this. The book will
therefore be of great help to all philosophers of science who want to get new vistas on
the old (and perhaps somewhat old-fashioned) problems of theory choice and the
relations between scientiﬁc theories. In sum, this is a welcome contribution to the
current debate and should be consulted by everyone who wishes to back up her
position by means of examples from actual scientiﬁc practice.
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